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“THE IMPORTANCE OF OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS” ON GAYS IN THE 
MILITARY: A RESPONSE TO ELAINE DONNELLY’S CONSTRUCTING THE 
CO-ED MILITARY1 
JEANNE SCHEPER* 
NATHANIEL FRANK** 
AARON BELKIN*** 
GARY J. GATES **** 
On February 28, 2007, former Rep. Martin Meehan (D-MA) and a bipartisan 
group of co-sponsors reintroduced the Military Readiness Enhancement Act in 
the House of Representatives to amend title 10 United States Code § 654 (“Policy 
Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces”) to enhance the readiness of 
the Armed Forces by replacing the current “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy with a 
policy of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  In the recent 
DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW AND POLICY article, “Constructing the Co-Ed 
Military,” Elaine Donnelly, president of the Center for Military Readiness, 
asserts that “nothing has changed that would justify the turmoil that would 
occur in and outside of Congress if Meehan’s legislation were seriously 
considered or passed.”2  But on what evidence is she basing her claims that 
turmoil would ensue if 10 U.S.C § 654, the ban on openly gay service members, 
were repealed? 
 
 1. Elaine Donnelly, Constructing the Co-Ed Military, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 815, 816 
(2007) [hereinafter Donnelly]. The title of the first subsection of Elaine Donnelly’s article is “The 
Importance of Objective Analysis.” In the following response we address Donnelly on precisely this 
point. 
 * Dr. Jeanne Scheper is Research Director of the Palm Center and an affiliated research scholar 
in Women’s Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. 
 ** Dr. Nathaniel Frank is Senior Research Fellow at the Palm Center, University of California, 
Santa Barbara, and teaches on the adjunct faculty at New York University.  His scholarship and 
writing on gays in the military and other topics have appeared in the New York Times, Washington 
Post, The New Republic, Los Angeles Times, Newsday, Slate and others, and he has been interviewed on 
major television and radio programs. His book, UNFRIENDLY FIRE: HOW THE GAY BAN UNDERMINES 
THE MILITARY AND WEAKENS AMERICA, will be published by St. Martin’s Press in 2009. 
 *** Dr. Aaron Belkin is Director of the Palm Center and an Associate Professor of Political 
Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. 
 **** Dr. Gary J. Gates is a Senior Research Fellow at the Williams Institute, University of 
California, Los Angeles School of Law.  His research focuses on the geographic, demographic, and 
economic characteristics of the lesbian and gay population. 
 2. Id. at 915. 
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The outcomes of repeal are exactly the points that an informed public 
conversation about the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy should be engaging, but in a 
serious, evidence-based debate.  And the focus of that debate should be not on 
fears of what would “occur in and outside of Congress,” but on the impact of 
any legislation on military readiness.  Signed into law in November of 1993 by 
President Clinton, the Defense Department issued the first set of comprehensive 
regulations in February of 1994.  The “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, once 
considered an interim measure by policy makers, has remained in force, 
relatively unchanged, for over fourteen years.3 
Contrary to Donnelly’s assertion, however, much has changed in the 
military, political, and cultural landscape since 1993.  Military opinion and 
public opinion have experienced dramatic shifts, which have been well 
documented by scholarly research and in the media.  The most recent evidence 
of these shifts, and perhaps the most telling, was a statement released by a 
group of twenty-eight retired U.S. generals and admirals urging Congress to 
repeal the current ban on openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual troops.4 The support 
of such a large number of senior military officers for an end to the so-called gay 
ban reflects nothing less than a sea change in military opinion on the issue.  In 
1993, when the current policy was formulated, some surveys found that 97 
percent of generals and admirals opposed lifting the ban.5 When General John 
Shalikashvili, who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1993 
through 1997, published an op-ed in The New York Times on January 2, 2007 
calling for the end of “don’t ask, don’t tell,” he cited polls showing that a large 
number of younger enlisted personnel also favor letting openly gay soldiers 
serve.6 That poll of 545 troops who served in Afghanistan and Iraq by Zogby 
International, found that 72 percent of service members are personally 
comfortable interacting with gays and lesbians.7  Public opinion polls show 
similarly strong indicators of change.  Furthermore, data indicate that the policy 
is now harming the military’s reputation because it is out of step with public 
opinion.8 
Donnelly contests all of this evidence.  She says that the research 
supporting the claim that discrimination undermines the military, and that 
 
 3. “I would not say that the policy that we are implementing here today is the policy that will 
be forever,” or also, “I would not say that this is gonna be it forever.” Secretary of Defense Les 
Aspin, News Conference with Jamie Gorelick, General Counsel, Department of Defense, Regarding 
the Regulations on Homosexual Conduct in the Military (Dec. 22, 1993). 
 4. Thom Shanker and Patrick Healy, A New Push to Roll Back ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 29, 2007. 
 5. Press Release, The Palm Center, Twenty-Eight Generals and Admirals Call for End to 
Military’s Gay Ban (Nov. 29, 2007), http://www.palmcenter.org/press/dadt/releases/ 
twenty_eight_generals_and_admirals_call_for_end_to_militarys_gay_ban_0. 
 6. John M. Shalikashvili, Editorial, Second Thoughts on Gays in the Military, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 
2007, §A, at 17. 
 7. Sam Rodgers, Opinions of Military Personnel on Sexual Minorities in the Military, Zogby 
International, Dec. 2006. Zogby reported both 72% and 73% at different times.  The discrepancy is 
attributable to the use of two different rounding methods, both of which are considered legitimate 
ways of deriving final figures from raw numbers. 
 8. See Aaron Belkin, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Does the Gay Ban Undermine the Military’s 
Reputation?, 34 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 276 (2008) [hereinafter Belkin, Don’t Ask]. 
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integration would enhance military effectiveness, is not compelling.  And she 
suggests that, “A closer look at materials produced by the activist groups 
usually reveals questionable methodology and unsupported conclusions.”9 The 
Palm Center, a research institute at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 
stands at the core of her offensive against full integration of openly gay and 
lesbian service members.  She repeatedly attempts to dismiss the credibility of 
the Palm Center’s research by labeling our data the product of “social 
engineers” and “activists.”10 
In the following pages, we respond to the substance of Donnelly’s critique, 
addressing the factual errors in her analysis, addressing her unsupported 
assertions about the quality and integrity of research in this area, in particular 
by the Palm Center, and commenting on the stakes raised by the rhetoric 
Donnelly chooses to deploy in presenting her position in lieu of evidence to 
support that position.11 An analysis of the substance of her complaints shows 
that her critique is without merit, that the methodologies behind the studies she 
cites are in fact sound, and that the data show that discrimination compromises 
military effectiveness, while integration enhances it.  We agree with one aspect 
of Donnelly’s argument: when lives and national security are at risk, basic 
assumptions must be challenged and objective analysis is at a premium.  And 
that is the place from which the Palm Center approaches our research. 
THE CENSUS KNOWS: ESTIMATING THE NUMBER OF GAY AND LESBIAN SERVICE 
MEMBERS 
One of the basic questions that inform public conversation about “don’t 
ask, don’t tell” involves the number of gays and lesbians serving in the armed 
forces.  Some commentators have suggested that ten percent of the American 
public is gay or lesbian12, and have applied this figure to the military, suggesting 
that ten percent of the armed forces, or 250,000 troops, may be gay.  
Unfortunately, the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy itself precludes conducting a 
survey of active-duty military personnel that asks respondents about their 
sexual orientation or behavior.  As a result, scholars have had to consider other 
approaches and methods to try to identify this otherwise hidden population of 
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals serving in the United States armed forces.  In 
2004, Dr. Gary Gates of the Urban Institute published a study which found that 
approximately 65,000 currently-serving troops are gay.13  Donnelly attacks 
Gates’ study, which she says amounts to “urban legend” rather than “a serious 
 
 9. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 916. 
 10. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 918, 938. 
 11. “We” refers to the authors, three of whom (Belkin, Frank, and Scheper) are Palm Center 
staff and one of whom (Gates) is affiliated with the Williams Institute at the University of California, 
Los Angeles School of Law and is also the author of research critiqued in Donnelly’s article. 
 12. ALFRED KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (W.B. Saunders Co. 1949) (1948). 
 13. Gary J. Gates, Gay Men and Lesbians in the U.S. Military: Estimates from Census 2000, THE 
URBAN INSTITUTE, Sep. 28 2004, at 4, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411069_Gay 
LesbianMilitary.pdf. 
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piece of scholarship,”14 but virtually every assertion Donnelly makes in 
describing the study is incorrect. 
Donnelly’s first incorrect assertion is that the Urban Institute analysis 
includes a “speculative claim” that in the U.S. four percent of men and three 
percent of women are lesbian or gay.15  In fact, findings from a study published 
after the Urban Institute study suggest that these figures actually underestimate 
the fraction of lesbian, gay, and bisexual identified men and women in the 
United States.16  A federally-funded nationally representative survey of men and 
women aged 18-44 found that 4.1 percent of both men and women self-
identified as either “homosexual” or “bisexual.”17  This suggests that the Urban 
Institute study likely underestimates the size of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
population. 
Donnelly continues with a claim that the study “speculated that household-
mates of the same-sex are homosexual.”18  The fact that same-sex “unmarried 
partners” identified in the U.S. Census are likely lesbian and gay couples is not 
speculation.  To begin with, the same-sex couples identified in the U.S. Census 
are not simply “household-mates”19 as the author suggests.  Rather, they are 
same-sex couples in which one partner is explicitly identified as either the 
“husband/wife” or “unmarried partner” of the other partner.20  Therefore, those 
identified as “roommates,” “boarders,” and “unrelated adults” are not included 
among these couples.  Nor are any same-sex couples with blood relationships 
such as siblings, cousins, or children.  Social scientists and government officials 
have closely considered this question of categorization and are in broad 
agreement that same-sex “unmarried partner” couples identified in the Census 
are indeed lesbian and gay couples.21 
 
 14. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 924. 
 15. Id. 
 16. William D. Mosher et al., 2005.  Sexual Behavior and Selected Health Measures: Men and Women 
15–44 Years of Age, United States, 2002 362.  ADVANCE DATA FROM VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS 1.  
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005) 
[hereinafter Mosher et al.]. 
 17. Id. at 3. 
 18. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 924. 
 19. Id. 
 20. U.S. Census 2000 Long Form D-2, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/d02p.pdf. 
 21. See Marieka M. Klawitter & Victor Flatt, The Effects of State and Local Antidiscrimination 
Policies on Earnings for Gays and Lesbians, 17 J. OF POL’Y ANALYS. AND MGMT. 658–86 (1998) 
[hereinafter Klawitter & Flatt]; Black et al., Demographics of the Gay and Lesbian Population in the United 
States: Evidence from Available Systematic Data Sources, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 139–54 (2000) [hereinafter 
Black]; Sylvia A. Allegretto & Michelle M. Arthur, An Empirical Analysis of Homosexual/Heterosexual 
Male Earnings Differentials: Unmarried and Unequal? 54 INDUS. & LAB.REL. REV. 631–46 (2001) 
[hereinafter Allegretto & Arthur]; Lisa K. Jepsen & Christopher A. Jepsen, An Empirical Analysis of the 
Matching Patterns of Same-Sex and Opposite-Sex Couples, 39 DEMOGRAPHY 435–53 (2002) [hereinafter 
Jepsen & Jepsen]; Dan Black; Gary Gates; Seth Sanders; Lowell Taylor, Why Do Gay Men Live in San 
Francisco?, 51 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS, (2002) 54–76; Gary J. Gates & Jason Ost, THE GAY AND 
LESBIAN ATLAS, (Urban Institute Press, 2004); THE POTENTIAL BUDGETARY IMPACT OF RECOGNIZING 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGES (Congressional Budget Office 2004); Gary J. Gates & Randall L. Sell, Measuring 
Gay and Lesbian Couples, in THE HANDBOOK OF MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN FAMILY RESEARCH (Sandra L. 
Hofferth & Lynne M. Casper eds., Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 2006) [hereinafter Gates & Sell]; Patrick 
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In the specific case of military service, same-sex couples appear to be a 
reasonable proxy for the broader lesbian, gay, and bisexual population.  Black 
and colleagues compare military service rates among same-sex couples in the 
Census to men and women in the General Social Survey (a nationally 
representative sample of adults) who indicate that they have had exclusively 
same-sex sexual partners in the last five years.22  The estimates, it turns out, are 
virtually the same. 
Donnelly incorrectly states that the analyses are based on the fraction of 
individuals in same-sex couples who identify as “veterans.”23  In fact, the 
estimates for the number of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals in the military are 
based on the fraction of individuals in same-sex couples who indicate that they 
are on active duty in the military and, separately, on those who indicate that 
they are in the ready reserve forces (National Guard and Reserve).  The report 
uses these figures to estimate the number of lesbian, gay men, and bisexuals on 
active duty and in the ready reserve.  The analyses also separately consider the 
number of lesbian, gay, and bisexuals who are veterans using only those in 
same-sex couples who state that they have prior military service. 
Finally, Donnelly claims that the Urban Institute report uses “questionable 
methodology.”24  In fact, the report uses well-known statistical procedures and 
conservative assumptions to reach its conclusions.  The primary statistical 
analyses use Bayes’ Rule, a common procedure frequently used by statisticians.  
To estimate the size of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual population currently 
serving in the military using Bayes’ Rule, the analyses rely on two key 
assumptions, both of which err on the side of a conservative estimate: 
1. Four percent of men and three percent of women in the U.S. population 
are lesbian, gay, or bisexual.  As already stated, Mosher et al. (2005) 
find that 4.1 percent of both men and women identify as such.25 
2. The fraction of individuals in same-sex couples who report being on 
active duty or in the ready reserve is the same as the fraction of all 
lesbian, gay men, and bisexuals serving in the military.  As the report 
clearly states, this likely underestimates the latter as it seems 
reasonable to believe that single lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals can 
more easily serve and hide their sexual orientation (as the “don’t ask, 
don’t tell” policy dictates) than can their coupled counterparts.  As 
such, the statistic derived from same-sex couples likely underestimates 
the real fraction of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals presently serving 
in the military. 
Far from “urban legend,” the Urban Institute study is based on high-
quality data, sound statistical techniques, and conservative assumptions.  The 
 
Festy, Enumerating Same-Sex Couples in Censuses and Population Registers, 17.12 DEMOGRAPHIC 
RESEARCH, 339–68 (2007); Lisa K. Jepsen, Comparing the Earnings of Cohabiting Lesbians, Cohabiting 
Heterosexual Women, and Married Women: Evidence from the 2000 Census, 46 INDUS. REL. 699–727 (2007) 
[hereinafter Jepsen]; Dan Black, Seth Sanders, Lowell Taylor, The Economics of Lesbian and Gay 
Families 21  JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 53–70 (2007). 
 22. Black, supra note 21. 
 23. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 924. 
 24. Id. at 923. 
 25. Mosher et al., supra note 16. 
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report offers a credible estimate for the size of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
population serving in the U.S. military: an estimated 65,000 active and reserve 
military members are currently serving.26 
THE COST OF FIRING GAYS AND LESBIANS 
What is the financial cost of firing gays and lesbians from the military?  In 
February 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report 
that found that during its first ten years, the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy cost 
$190.5 million to implement.27  The Palm Center organized a Blue Ribbon 
Commission to study the GAO’s report, and the Commission included 
distinguished experts including professors at military universities, a retired U.S. 
Army Colonel with a Ph.D. in economics, and a former Secretary of Defense.  
The Commission’s work was vetted by an accounting professor from the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
The Commission found that the GAO’s findings were based on 
questionable data and methodology, and determined that the GAO’s errors led 
to both over- and under-estimations of the total cost of implementing “don’t ask, 
don’t tell.”  When the over- and under-estimations were reconciled, it was 
determined that the GAO’s overall estimate was 91 percent too low, and that the 
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy cost the Pentagon at least $363.8 million to 
implement during its first ten years.28  Because the Commission used 
conservative assumptions, it argued that its finding should be seen as a lower-
bound estimate.29 
Donnelly questions the Commission’s findings on two grounds.  First, she 
says, the issue is not the cost of implementing “don’t ask, don’t tell.”  Rather, she 
claims, “It is the cost of recruiting and training individuals who are not eligible 
to serve in the military because they are homosexual.”30  She argues, “losses 
related to the homosexual conduct law, whatever it is, could be reduced to near-
zero if all potential recruits were fully and accurately notified that the 1993 law 
means that homosexuals are not eligible to serve.”31  The flaw in Donnelly’s 
reasoning, however, is that even if “don’t ask, don’t tell” were interpreted, as 
she would have it, to prohibit all gays and lesbians from serving (which we 
show below it does not), the financial cost of the policy would still be large.  
From the 1940s until 1993, gays and lesbians were prohibited from serving as a 
result of a complete and outright ban, and during this time the military fired 
 
 26. On social science estimates and methods for analyzing gay and lesbian populations, see 
Allegretto & Arthur, supra note 21, Dan A. Black et al., The Economics of Lesbian and Gay Families, 21 J. 
OF ECON. PERSP. 53 (2007), Dan A. Black et al., Why Do Gay Men Live in San Francisco? 51 J. OF URB. 
ECON. 54 (2007).  Enumerating Same-Sex Couples in Censuses and Population Registers, 17 DEMOG. RES. 
339; Gates & Ost, supra note 21; Gates & Sell, supra note 21; Jepsen & Jepsen, supra note 21; Jepsen, 
supra note 21; Klawitter & Flatt, supra note 21; Mosher et al., supra note 16. 
 27. Josh White, ‘Don’t Ask’ Costs More Than Expected, WASHINGTON Post, Feb. 14, 2006, at A04. 
 28. Id. at, at 8. 
 29. Memorandum from Aaron Belkin, to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Differing Results of GAO 
and Blue Ribbon Commission Studies (Sept. 25, 2006) available at http://www.palmcenter.org/files/ 
active/0/20060925_ReplyGAOcritique.pdf. 
 30. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 920. 
 31. Id. 
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approximately 2,000 people each year for being gay.32  (Approximately 1,000 per 
year have been fired under “don’t ask, don’t tell.”)33  Hence, even under a 
complete and total ban, the financial cost of firing gays and lesbians would be as 
high or higher than it is under “don’t ask, don’t tell.” 
Second, Donnelly questions the Blue Ribbon Commission’s findings and 
defends the GAO’s original report by noting that the GAO “‘stood by’” its 
original analysis even after the Blue Ribbon Commission had critiqued it.34  It is 
correct that the GAO “stood by” its original report, but this does not mean that 
its original report was sound.  As the Blue Ribbon Commission first explained in 
its report, and then reiterated in an analysis of the GAO’s defense by Blue 
Ribbon Commission Chair Aaron Belkin, the GAO misrepresented a critical 
piece of cost-of-training data that led to a $150 million dollar error.35  In previous 
GAO studies, and as is widely reported throughout the military manpower / 
personnel literature, the cost to train one enlisted service member, 
conservatively, was approximately $25,000 to $30,000 in the 1990s.36  In its 
original report, however, the GAO contradicted its own prior studies and 
reported that it cost only $6,400 for the Army to train one soldier.37  By using 
inaccurate data to estimate the cost of training enlisted personnel who were 
subsequently fired for being gay or lesbian, the GAO missed approximately 
$150 million of costs.  Donnelly and the GAO can only stand behind the original 
GAO study if they believe that it cost $6,400 to train one soldier in the 1990s.  
This figure, however, is not supported in the literature, and seems particularly 
off-target when one considers, as the Commission found, that service members 
fired for being gay received, on average, more initial skill and mid-career 
training than other members of the military. 
WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE FROM FOREIGN MILITARIES 
One central question in the U.S. debate over gays and lesbians in the 
military is whether cohesion, readiness, morale, and recruiting have suffered in 
foreign military forces that have lifted their gay bans.  According to some social 
scientists, foreign military experiences provide an opportunity for assessing the 
plausibility of the claim that if the American ban were to be lifted, the 
effectiveness of the U.S. armed forces would decline.  If military effectiveness 
declined as a result of foreign military decisions to lift gay bans, then that might 
suggest that a similar result could ensue if U.S. law and policy shifted.  If 
military effectiveness either increased or remained the same after foreign 
military forces decided to allow gays and lesbians to serve openly, that might 
 
 32. The discharge rates fluctuated considerably; in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they dipped 
below 1,000 per year, but on average during the Cold War, the annual discharge rate was about 
2,000. See DoD’s Policy on Homosexuality: Report to Congressional Requesters, 8 GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE (1992). See Rhonda L. Evans, U.S. Military Policies Concerning Homosexuals: Development, 
Implementation, and Outcomes, 11 LAW AND SEXUALITY 113 (2002). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Donnelly, supra note 1. 
 35. Belkin, supra note 29. 
 36. Id. at 3. 
 37. Id. 
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cast doubt on the plausibility of disastrous predictions about a policy change in 
the U.S. 
Numerous social scientific studies have found that despite occasional and 
isolated problems of adjustment, foreign militaries that have lifted their gay 
bans have not suffered any overall decrease in cohesion, readiness, morale, or 
recruiting as a result of their policy transitions.38  Indeed, in the more than thirty 
years since the Dutch military became the first to lift its gay ban,39 there has not 
been a single study documenting any decline in cohesion, readiness, recruiting, 
or morale as a result of a decision to lift a gay ban in any of the twenty-four 
foreign forces which have done so since that time.  Despite the complete absence 
of studies to bolster their claims, Donnelly and other opponents of integration 
have continued to assert and then repeat several distinct claims about foreign 
 
 38. See Aaron Belkin and Jason McNichol, Effects of the 1992 Lifting of Restrictions on Gay and 
Lesbian Service in the Canadian Forces: Appraising the Evidence (The Center for the Study of Sexual 
Minorities in the Military [CSSMM] 2000); see also Aaron Belkin & Melissa Levitt, The Effects of 
Including Gay and Lesbian Soldiers in the Israeli Defense Forces: Appraising the Evidence (CSSMM 2000); 
see also Aaron Belkin & Jason McNichol, The Effects of Including Gay and Lesbian Soldiers in the 
Australian Defence Forces: Appraising the Evidence (CSSMM 2000); see also Aaron Belkin & R. L. Evans, 
The Effects of Including Gay and Lesbian Soldiers in the British Armed Forces: Appraising the Evidence 
(CSSMM 2000) (all of these studies are available at http://www.palmcenter.org/publications/dadt). 
See also RAND’s National Defense Research Institute Report. RAND researchers conducted 
interviews with Canadian military personnel several months after the removal of the ban on gay and 
lesbian soldiers. They found no evidence that the policy change had had any appreciable effect on 
any aspect of military life or performance. (RAND’s report was begun at the request of U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin sometime after January 29, 1993 and completed before July 19, 1993.); 
see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOMOSEXUALS IN THE MILITARY: POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF 
FOREIGN COUNTRIES (1993) [hereinafter GAO 1993] (A U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) 
analysis of the first six months of Canada’s new policy also found no problems associated with the 
change. In their interviews with members of Parliament, gay advocacy groups, a veterans’ umbrella 
group, the Canadian Human Rights Commission, the Department of National Defence, and the 
Department of Justice, the researchers could find no one who had received any reports of 
resignations, lower recruitment, morale or cohesiveness problems, or gay-bashing incidents. In 
addition, the GAO found no reports of open displays of homosexual behavior). In June 1993, seven 
months after the Australian ban on homosexual service was lifted, the General Accounting Office of 
the United States conducted interviews with ADF officials to document early outcomes associated 
with the change (GAO 1993). The short overview of the policy change concludes with a summary 
statement based on comments from an “Australian official,” who stated that: “Although it is too 
early to assess the results of the revised policy, no reported changes have occurred in the number of 
persons declaring his or her sexual preference or the number of recruits being inducted. Effects on 
unit cohesiveness have not yet been fully determined. However, early indications are that the new 
policy has had little or no adverse impact.” (GAO 1993 at 19); see also U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
RESEARCH REPORT AT THE REQUEST OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE U.S. ARMY. The U.S. Army 
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences issued a report in January of 1994 authored 
by an outside consultant evaluating early outcomes of the lifting of the ban in Canada. The report 
surveyed all publicly available literature to describe the original impetus to lift the ban as well as the 
consequences of the 1992 policy change on a broad array of performance outcomes in the Canadian 
Forces. It its summary of findings, the report states: “The impact of the policy change has been 
minimal. Negative consequences predicted in the areas of recruitment, employment, attrition, 
retention, and cohesion and morale have not occurred in the 6-month period since revocation of the 
exclusionary policy.” (Pinch 1994: vii-viii). See also F.C. Pinch, 1994. Perspectives on Organizational 
Change in the Canadian Forces (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 
1994). 
 39. GREGORY HEREK ET AL., OUT IN FORCE 114 (University of Chicago Press 1996). 
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militaries, each of which are untrue or misleading.  Here, we address each claim 
in turn. 
To begin, Donnelly posits that the studies that document the successful 
experiences of foreign militaries that lifted their bans are based “on anecdotal 
information and opinion, largely gathered from like-minded sources.”40  Her 
evidence?  She reprints several sections of a previously published critique of a 
Palm Center study.  The original study, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Is the Gay Ban Based 
on Military Necessity? was published by PARAMETERS, the official journal of the 
Army War College, and found that Britain, Canada, Israel, and Australia 
successfully lifted their bans, with no detriment to military effectiveness.41  In a 
subsequent 2004 issue, PARAMETERS published a critique of Belkin’s study, as 
well as Belkin’s reply to that assessment.  Here is the 2004 passage that Donnelly 
re-prints: 
Belkin’s article is entirely anecdotal.  It is nothing more than selected quotes 
from supposed experts who claim that homosexual integration has had no 
impact on unit cohesion or military readiness.  A quick review of the author’s 
endnotes, cross-checked with an internet search, reveals the questionable 
credentials and political leanings of most of these experts.  At one point, Belkin 
refers to a 1995 Canadian government report, which supposedly indicates that 
lifting the ban on gays in the military had ‘no effect.’  However, his endnote 
does not cite the report but a ‘personal communication with Karol Wenek.’42 
The passage which Donnelly found wanting in Belkin’s article read: “A 1995 
internal report from the Canadian government on the lifting of the ban 
concluded, ‘Despite all the anxiety that existed through the late 80s into the early 
90s about the change in policy, here’s what the indicators show—no effect.’”43  
The supporting footnote cites the source of the quote: “Personal communication 
with Karol Wenek, Directorate of Policy Analysis and Development, Canadian 
Forces, 20 January, 2000.”44  As Belkin explained in his 2004 response, there was 
a straightforward reason why he cited a personal communication with Wenek 
rather than the document itself (titled “Briefing Note for Director of Public 
Policy,” Ottawa, Canadian Forces, 25 August 1995): the quote was intended to 
represent Wenek’s description of the report’s conclusion, and hence sufficed to 
summarize its findings.  The Palm Center posted the original report on its web 
site four years ago, and it remains there to this day. 
As Belkin also explained in his 2004 reply, his research is anything but 
anecdotal.  His published work on foreign militaries is based on reviews of 
hundreds of printed sources including government documents.  And as the 
studies explain in detail, Belkin and his colleagues used standard social scientific 
practices to ensure that their search for documents and experts was thorough.  
Anyone interested in the source lists can consult the extensive reference sections 
 
 40. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 927. 
 41. Aaron Belkin, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Is the Gay Ban Based on Military Necessity?  33 
PARAMETERS 111 (2003). 
 42. Donnelly, supra note 1. 
 43. Belkin, supra note 41, at 118. 
 44. Donnelly, supra note 1. 
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of studies listed in endnote 6 of the Parameters article.45  The interview subjects 
cited in the Parameters article included officers and enlisted personnel, ministry 
representatives, academics, veterans, politicians, and nongovernmental 
observers, including every identifiable expert in Israel, Canada, Britain, and 
Australia on gays in the military.  In other words, Belkin and his colleagues 
interviewed the universe of experts, a standard far exceeding the acceptable 
research practice of interviewing a representative sample of experts.  They 
included and interviewed every identifiable expert who had opposed allowing 
gays to serve openly in these four militaries.  One of Belkin’s interview subjects, 
for example, was Professor Christopher Dandeker, former Chair of War Studies 
at Kings College London and perhaps the most distinguished scholar of the 
British military.  In 1999, Dandeker wrote that if Britain lifted its ban, readiness 
would deteriorate.46  After British policy changed, Dandeker concluded that his 
prediction had been incorrect.47  When the totality of experts on a particular 
military, including those who had predicted disaster, testifies that there is no 
indication that lifting a ban undermined military effectiveness that does not 
amount to anecdotal evidence. 
In addition to claiming that studies which document foreign military 
successes are based on anecdotes, Donnelly says that foreign militaries that have 
lifted their bans have suffered as a result.  “Contrary to the notion that all has 
gone well,” she notes, “European newspapers have reported recruiting and 
disciplinary problems in the British military.”48  She cites five newspaper and 
radio stories49 to support her assertion.  The question of consequence, however, 
is not whether “all has gone well,” as scholars of gays and lesbians in foreign 
militaries acknowledge quite candidly that isolated adjustment problems have 
occurred in some units following the lifting of gay bans.  Rather, the question is 
whether overall military effectiveness has increased, decreased, or remained the 
same as a result of the lifting of gay bans.  Neither Donnelly nor anyone else has 
presented a shred of evidence of an overall decline in any country that has lifted 
its ban.  Indeed, none of the five media stories that Donnelly cites shows or even 
suggests that the lifting of a gay ban undermined the overall readiness of any 
foreign military.50  One of those stories, for example, is headlined, War Blamed as 
6,000 Quit Territorial Army.51  Is Donnelly insinuating that the lifting of the gay 
ban is to blame?  Can this be the best evidence to show that the lifting of the 
 
 45. The studies cited in endnote 6 of the original article, Belkin, supra note 41, at 118. 
 46. See Tarak Barkawi & Christopher Dandeker, Rights and Fights: Sexual Orientation and Military 
Effectiveness, 24 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 186 (1999). 
 47. AARON BELKIN & GEOFFREY BATEMAN, DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL: DEBATING THE GAY BAN IN 
THE MILITARY 132–34 (Lynne Rienner, 2003). 
 48. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 926. 
 49. Id. at n. 545. 
 50. Id. at n. 545. 
 51. Michael Smith, War Blamed as 6,000 Quit Territorial Army, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 30, 
2005, at News 2. This article makes no mention of gay service. Only one of her five citations 
mentions gay service, and that article refers to Navy efforts in the U.K. to recruit gay sailors, 
Nicholas Hellen, Navy Signals for Help to Recruit Gay Sailors, TIMESONLINE (London), Feb. 20, 2005, 
available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article516647.ece. 
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British ban has undermined military effectiveness?  The article itself makes no 
reference to the lifting of the ban or to gays and lesbians in the military. 
Meanwhile, the British Ministry of Defence itself has completed several in-
depth, service-wide assessments, which concluded that the decision to allow 
gays and lesbians to serve openly did not have any overall negative effect on 
cohesion, morale, readiness, or recruiting, despite a few isolated problems in 
some units.52  Rather than citing five media articles, which report on unrelated 
problems the British military was facing, we wonder why Donnelly and the 
Center for Military Readiness do not conduct an actual study of the effects of 
decisions to lift gay bans in foreign militaries.  As noted before, it has been over 
thirty years since the Dutch military became the first to lift its ban,53 yet in that 
time not a single study has documented a decrease in military effectiveness that 
resulted from the lifting of a ban.  Another challenge not met by Donnelly is 
identification of a single expert, anywhere in the world, who believes that any of 
the 24 foreign militaries that have lifted their gay bans have suffered an overall 
decrease in cohesion, readiness, morale, or recruiting as a result.  In our studies, 
we have identified over one hundred who believe the opposite to be the case. 
By way of dismissing wholesale the value of comparative analysis, 
Donnelly notes that perhaps these lessons from foreign militaries are of limited 
value, as some of the countries that have lifted their bans “have cultures quite 
different from the United States.”54  It is certainly the case—and it is regularly 
acknowledged by supporters of eliminating “don’t ask, don’t tell”—that 
important differences distinguish the U.S. military from other armed forces.  But 
we suggest that the relevant question is not whether differences exist, but 
whether they render foreign military experiences irrelevant for determining 
whether military effectiveness would decline if gays and lesbians were allowed 
to serve openly in the U.S.  Indeed, as the Palm Center has shown elsewhere, 
cultural differences do not diminish the usefulness of examining the experience 
of foreign militaries to draw lessons by analogy.55  In their 2001 study published 
by the journal ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY, Belkin and Levitt argue that 
American public and military culture are more tolerant of homosexuality than 
the cultures of foreign countries which have lifted their bans.56  Moreover, they 
show that tolerant national climates are not necessary for maintaining cohesion, 
readiness, morale, and performance after the integration of a minority group 
into the military.  Among the 24 nations that allow gays and lesbians to serve in 
the military, many include powerful social and political groups that oppose gay 
rights.57  Similarly, it would not be possible for the numerous U.S. police and fire 
departments that allow gays and lesbians to serve openly to continue to function 
 
 52. E.g., Tri-Service Review of the Armed Forces Policy on Homosexuality and Code of Social Conduct 
(2000); A Review of the Armed Forces Policy on Homosexuality (2000). 
 53. HEREK, supra note 39. 
 54. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 927. 
 55. See Aaron Belkin & Melissa Levitt, Homosexuality and the Israel Defense Forces; Did Lifting the 
Gay Ban Undermine Military Performance? 27 ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY 1 (2001). 
 56. Id. at 20–21. 
 57. THE GLOBAL EMERGENCE OF GAY AND LESBIAN POLITICS; NATIONAL IMPRINTS OF A 
WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT (Barry Adam, Jan Willem Duyvendak & André Krouwel, eds., Temple 
University Press 1999). 
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smoothly if a fully tolerant national climate were necessary for the maintenance 
of organizational effectiveness.  While cautioning against unilaterally equating 
the experience of racial integration with the integration of openly gay people, it 
is nonetheless noteworthy that the U.S. military was ordered to allow African-
American soldiers to serve on an equal basis at a time when 63 percent of the 
American public opposed integration.58  The example of racial integration does 
demonstrate that tolerant cultural and institutional climates are not necessary 
for maintaining organizational effectiveness when minority groups are 
integrated into the military.  Twenty-four countries have successfully integrated 
gays and lesbians into their military forces, and each of these nations has a 
unique culture.  Clearly, countries representing a broad spectrum of cultural 
differences have successfully lifted their bans.  And experience shows that 
nations can apply, and have applied, the successes of one nation to the prospects 
of another. 
Opponents of gays in the military have not responded to this evidence that 
successful integration is possible, even at a time or in a place where a fully 
tolerant culture does not exist.  Nor have they acknowledged that some of the 
evidence for this point comes from the U.S. example.59  Rather, they simply and 
systematically repeat the assertion that U.S. culture is different.  Instead of  
engaging with the scholarly arguments, which have been part of the landscape 
of the gays-in-the-military debate for years, Donnelly simply iterates the point 
that American culture is unique; and she presumes that this declaration of 
uniqueness and exceptionalism in and of itself represents the obstruction to the 
successful lifting of the ban, when data show that in fact it does not. 
Finally, Donnelly states that according to an expert, “nations without 
official restrictions on gays in the military are also very restrictive in actual 
practice.”60  She then cites a 1993 newspaper article to support her contention 
that in Israel, gay soldiers are barred from elite combat positions.61  This ignores 
the Palm Center’s 2001 survey of 136 combat soldiers in the Israel Defense 
Forces, 17 percent of whom said that they know a gay soldier in their unit.  (23 
percent said ‘maybe’ and 60 percent said ‘no.’)62  Donnelly is correct in noting 
that the reality on the ground does not always line up with policy after a 
country decides to lift its gay ban.  Again, however, the significant question is 
not whether policy and practice are consistent, but whether the decision to lift a 
gay ban undermines military effectiveness.  The evidence shows that it does not. 
 
 58. Barkawi & Dandeker, supra note 46, at 195. 
 59. See Evans, supra note 50. 
 60. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 927 (explaining that Prof. Charles Moskos asserts this point.). 
 61. Id. at n.548 (citing Tom Philpott, In Israel: The Hard Reality - Gays Are Allowed to Serve in the 
Military but They Are Not Fully Accepted, ARMY TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at 11); Tom Philpott, Gay Israelis 
Avoid Ridicule, Get Ahead by Staying in Closet, ARMY TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at 13; Charles Moskos, 
Services Will Suffer If Used for Social Experiments, RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 1993, at F1. 
 62. Aaron Belkin and Melissa Levitt, Homosexuality and the Israel Defense Forces; Did Lifting the 
Gay Ban Undermine Military Performance? 27 ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY 541 (2001), available at 
http://afs.sagepub.com/content/vol27/issue4/ and at 
http://www.palmcenter.org/publications/dadt/homosexuality_and_the_israel_defense_forces. 
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GAYS, LESBIANS, AND U.S. WARTIME SERVICE 
The “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy is often defended with the claim that 
heterosexuals cannot form bonds of trust with gays and lesbians, and that to 
force gays and straights to serve together would thus erode the unit cohesion 
that is essential to fighting effectiveness.  In light of this claim, it is perhaps 
ironic that, as scholars have noticed, the Pentagon fires fewer gays and lesbians 
during wartime, when cohesion matters most.  Scholars have suggested that if 
gays and lesbians truly undermined cohesion, perhaps it would make more 
sense to increase discharges during times of combat. 
Donnelly disputes the data showing that fewer gays and lesbians are fired 
during wartime, but her claims are without merit, as the evidence shows that the 
military delays and neglects gay discharges during war.  For example, the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) has acknowledged that suspected gays 
and lesbians have been sent to war, noting that, 
as a result of these policies and laws, the situation that arises during a time of 
deployment place[s] homosexuals in a no-win situation.  They are allowed or 
ordered to serve at the risk of their own lives with the probability of forced 
discharge when hostilities end if their sexuality becomes an issue.  By deploying 
suspected homosexuals with their units, the services bring into question their 
own argument that the presence of homosexuals seriously impairs the 
accomplishment of the military mission.63 
Oddly, Donnelly cites a later version of this very same CRS report to bolster her 
argument, but this version edits out the admission that gays and lesbians are 
sometimes knowingly “ordered to serve at the risk of their own lives with the 
probability of forced discharge when hostilities end.”64 
Other data confirms CRS’s conclusion.  The journalist Randy Shilts 
interviewed scores of service members from the first Gulf War and documented 
a pattern of retaining gays during war, and then discharging them once peace 
returns.65  A number of press reports describe the practice of letting known gays 
serve during wartime, including more than one article in THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL about troops who revealed their sexual orientation and were 
knowingly sent to war.66  In 2006 and 2007, the Navy twice deployed a gay sailor 
 
 63. Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Services: Hearings Before the Senate Armed 
Services Comm., 103d Cong. 17–18 (Mar. 29, 1993) (testimony of David F. Burrelli, Analyst in National 
Defense, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress). 
 64. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 921, n.515. 
 65. The Shilts tapes are stored in the Randy Shilts Papers at the San Francisco Public Library.  
For published articles, see Randy Shilts, Military May Defer Discharge of Gays, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 11, 
1991; Randy Shilts, Army Discharges Lesbian Who Challenged Ban, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 1991; Randy 
Shilts, Gay Troops in the Gulf War Can’t Come Out, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 18, 1991; Randy Shilts, In Wake of 
War, Military Again Targets Gays, S.F. CHRON., Aug 5, 1991; also see RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT 
UNBECOMING: GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE U.S. MILITARY (Columbine-Fawcett 1993). 
 66. See Wade Lambert, Gay GI’s Told, Serve Now, Face Discharge Later WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1991, at 
B1; Wade Lambert & Stephanie Simon, U.S. Military Moves to Discharge Some Gay Veterans of Gulf 
War, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1991, at B6; Doug Grow, Captain Did her Duty, Despite Military’s Mixed 
Messages, MINN. STAR TRIB., March 16, 1993, at 3B; David Kirby, Think Before You Tell, THE 
ADVOCATE, Dec. 4, 2001. 
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to duty despite his public acknowledgement that he was gay. 67  His dismissal 
form was marked “completion of service” rather than homosexual conduct, thus 
allowing the Navy to re-deploy him in the future.68  Only after the sailor became 
the subject of an article in STARS AND STRIPES, a military newspaper, did the 
Navy finally and swiftly discharge him for homosexual conduct.69 
In 2005, the Palm Center publicized additional data showing this same 
pattern of retaining known gay and lesbian troops during the recent wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, notwithstanding the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy.  The 
evidence the Palm Center supplied began with an Army Commander’s 
Handbook obtained in 2005 entitled, “Regulation 500-3-3 Volume III, Reserve 
Component Unit Commanders Handbook.”  In Table 2.1 on “Personnel Actions 
during the Mobilization Process,” it says under the criterion of “homosexuality”: 
“if discharge is not requested prior to the unit’s receipt of alert notification, 
discharge isn’t authorized.  Member will enter AD [active duty] with the unit.”70  
As we reported, the intent of this document—to reduce the loss of personnel 
during mobilization—was corroborated by Kim Waldron, spokesperson at the 
U.S. Army Forces Command at Fort McPherson, who acknowledged publicly 
that the Pentagon was sending openly gay service members into combat in Iraq: 
“The bottom line is some people are using sexual orientation to avoid 
deployment,” she said.  “So in this case, with the Reserve and Guard forces, if a 
soldier ‘tells,’ they still have to go to war and the homosexual issue is postponed 
until they return to the U.S. and the unit is demobilized.”71 
Donnelly disputes our interpretation of the regulation, but her sole 
evidence for doing so is a personal email she received from a military 
spokesperson, which Donnelly declares “countered that argument with a 
clarification.”72  The email itself, however, offers no evidence or explanation for 
why the earlier official Pentagon statement given might be wrong, but is simply 
a re-statement of policy, saying that if a soldier declares himself or herself to be 
gay or lesbian, “the review process continues while the unit is deployed and 
there is no delay in resolving the matter or discharging the Soldier if that is the 
resolution.”73  The email is non-responsive to the question of whether gays are, 
in fact, discharged when they make statements, since it effectively cancels itself 
out by ending with the phrase “if that is the resolution.” 
 
 67. See Joseph Giordono, Discharged Gay Sailor is Called Back to Active Duty, STARS AND STRIPES, 
May 6, 2007, available at http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&articles=54151&article 
=true; Joseph Giordono. Discharge Papers ‘Don’t Tell’ Sailor is Gay, STARS AND STRIPES, May 7, 2007, 
available at http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=54054&archive=true; Joseph 
Giordono, Navy Bars Outed Gay Sailor From Return to Service, STARS AND STRIPES, June 10, 2007, 
available at http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=54151&archive=true 
[hereinafter Giordono, Navy Bars]. 
 68. Giorono, Navy Bars, supra note 57. 
 69. Id. 
 70. FORSCOM REGULATION 500-3-3 VOLUME III, RESERVE COMPONENT UNIT COMMANDERS 
HANDBOOK (1990) since updated. 
 71. Waldron’s statements were reported in the WASHINGTON BLADE: Lou Chibbaro Jr., Out Gay 
Soldiers Sent to Iraq, Regulation Keeps Straights from “Playing Gay” to Avoid War, WASHINGTON BLADE, 
Sept. 23, 2005, available at http://www.washblade.com/2005/9-23/news/national/outiraq.cfm. 
 72. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 921. 
 73. Id. at 921, n.517. 
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The Palm Center received a nearly identical “personal” email from the 
Pentagon seeking to reverse Waldron’s statement, in response to our own effort 
to corroborate the Pentagon practice of retaining known gays.74  The only 
difference is that the email to Donnelly references the Pentagon’s earlier 
statement as coming from a “spokesman” while the email to us uses the word, 
“spokesperson” since it is in response to the statement of a woman, Kim 
Waldron.75  This means that, apparently, Waldron was not the only person to 
have acknowledged, in an official capacity, that during mobilization, 
homosexual discharge proceedings are postponed until the service member 
returns home. 
Donnelly posits that it is a “contradictory claim” to argue both that the 
military is losing too many gay and lesbian troops and also that discharge 
figures have declined since the United States went to war.76  There is, of course, 
no contradiction: one can simultaneously point to how any gay discharge 
undermines military readiness, while noting a downturn in discharge figures.  
And the discharge downturns since the U.S. mobilized for war in 2001 are 
undisputed: those figures declined every year but one since 2002, echoing a clear 
historical pattern in which gay and lesbian discharges decrease in all wars and 
military conflicts.77  The reader can weigh the evidence against the veracity of 
the claims made by Donnelly and decide which is more persuasive.  The 
Congressional Research Service, the Palm Center, and the other sources noted 
above have made the evidence available to the public. 
A SEA CHANGE IN MILITARY OPINION 
“Don’t ask, don’t tell” is designed to address heterosexual discomfort with 
serving alongside known gays and lesbians, and it is certainly the case that 
prejudice, intolerance, and discomfort remain a part of the American cultural 
landscape.  While it is true that many different kinds of Americans work 
together, play together, and live together, it is no doubt also the case that racism, 
sexism, and religious intolerance exist.  In none of these cases, however, does the 
government take polls of service members in order to formulate military 
personnel policy that caters to whether one group likes or dislikes another 
group.  In the case of “don’t ask, don’t tell,” however, Donnelly believes that 
unless and until heterosexual service members say that gays and lesbians should 
be allowed to serve openly, then law, regulation, and policy should continue to 
discriminate.78  And she selectively cites from unreliable polls to support her 
claim that integration would fail.79  While service members’ attitudes about 
serving alongside gays and lesbians cannot be assessed with 100 percent 
accuracy, some compelling data are nonetheless available, and those data 
suggest that significant shifts have taken place. 
 
 74. Chibbaro, supra note 71. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 920. 
 77. See Evans, supra note 32. 
 78. Donnelly, supra note 1. 
 79. Id. at 917–19. 
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Before documenting those shifts, however, it is important to explain why 
the polling results must be interpreted with caution, and why the polls that 
Donnelly cites are among the least reliable.  The Pentagon has, for years, rejected 
repeated requests to study “don’t ask, don’t tell” and this has posed a serious 
obstacle to those who want to understand attitudes of active duty service 
members.  Without the Pentagon’s cooperation, it is impossible to obtain a truly 
random sample of military personnel.  And random sampling is the gold 
standard of surveying techniques.  When a scholar wants to know about the 
attitudes of a population of people, usually it is necessary to take a poll of one 
sample of respondents drawn from the overall population in which the scholar 
is interested.  For example, to determine whether Americans believe that the 
President is doing a good job, it is too expensive to survey every single U.S. 
citizen, and it is not possible to force universal participation.  So, pollsters isolate 
a sample, usually about 1,000 people, and then report the attitudes of people in 
that sample as if they represented the same attitudes as the entire American 
public.  They use statistical techniques to create a model sample that best reflects 
the whole. 
Donnelly calls for “an objective poll of identified military personnel”80 and 
complains that available polling data are not based on random sampling.81  But 
without the Pentagon’s cooperation, no scholar can draw a random sample of 
military personnel.  Hence, scholars must develop techniques and sampling 
strategies to assemble respondents who will answer their surveys and will best 
reflect the population they wish to study.  Such statistical data are universally 
considered a valid method of data collection and widely used.  In fact, virtually 
no polling is done using truly random sampling techniques.  Almost all survey 
results including publicly released U.S. Census data and virtually every data 
product produced by the U.S. government uses statistical weighting.  Indeed, it 
should be noted that polls that Donnelly and her allies have cited over the past 
14 years to show that the troops dislike gays use just such approaches rather 
than random sampling, yet Donnelly never objects to the validity of polls that 
ostensibly support her case.  In fact, Donnelly cites selectively from polls based 
on the least reliable methodologies. 
One poll which Donnelly cites, for example, is administered to Military 
Times readers every year.82  The December 2003 Military Times poll of 933 active 
duty subscribers found that only 24.6 percent of respondents believe that gays 
and lesbians should be allowed to serve openly, with 63.2 percent opposing and 
12.2 percent expressing no opinion.83  While it is interesting and instructive to 
survey MILITARY TIMES readers, this group does not represent overall military 
opinion because it is not truly representative of the full military population. 
Unlike the overall military, the pool of MILITARY TIMES survey respondents was 
split about evenly in composition between officers and enlisted personnel, and 
included only nine individuals ranked E-3 or below, and only 41 individuals 
 
 80. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 918 n.502. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See the MILITARY TIMES Poll 200, http://www.militarycity.com/polls/2003_chart2.php#2 
(raw data from the Military Times on file with author). 
 83. Id. 
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aged 24 or below.  As both the Annenberg poll (discussed below) and MILITARY 
TIMES data show, support for allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly 
decreases as rank increases, and both the MILITARY TIMES and Gallup data show 
that support decreases as age rises.  Hence, the Military Times results probably 
under-estimated overall military support for integration. 
By contrast, Donnelly complains about a 2006 poll designed by Dr. Laura 
Miller, a military expert, along with scholars at the Palm Center, and 
adminstered by Zogby to 545 troops who served in Afghanistan or Iraq.84  
Donnelly says that the “absence of random access undermines the credibility of 
the poll,” but fails to acknowledge that statistical weights were used to 
approximate a representative sample of military respondents; in other words, 
mostly male, mostly conservative, and mostly enlisted.  Using statistical weights 
to approximate a randomly drawn sample is less compelling than random 
sampling itself, but it is, again, a commonly-used technique when random 
access is not available.  Statistical weighting is a much more scientific approach 
than that used by the Military Times poll which Donnelly praises; yet Donnelly 
makes no mention of this fact.  Donnelly complains that the poll was 
administered to a sample drawn “from a purchased list of U.S. Military 
Personnel” and wrongly assumes this cannot be true because “the U.S. military 
does not sell or provide access to personnel lists.”85  The list, however, was not 
purchased or obtained from the military (nor did we ever make such a claim), 
but was obtained from vendors who compile such lists.  Again, this approach is 
not as solid as random sampling, but in the absence of Pentagon cooperation, 
there can be no random sampling.  Rather than bemoaning the lack of random 
sampling by researchers, Donnelly should call on the Pentagon to cooperate 
with researchers to obtain the needed data, or offer a better scientific approach 
than the methods outlined here for tapping into military opinion. 
What do the most well-designed polls say about military opinion?  In 1993, 
two different surveys found that only 16 percent of male service members 
believed that gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve.86  Since that time, 
however, shifts have occurred in two distinct areas: whether service members 
are personally comfortable around gays and lesbians, and whether they believe 
that gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve openly.  On both counts, 
military opinion has shifted dramatically and there are a number of ways that 
this has been documented.87 
First consider the question of personal comfort.  The 2006 Zogby poll of 545 
troops who had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan found that 72 percent are 
personally comfortable interacting with gays, and that of the 20 percent who are 
uncomfortable, 15 percent are “somewhat” uncomfortable and only five percent 
 
 84. Opinions of Military Personnel on Sexual Minorities in the Military, Zogby International, Dec. 
2006. 
 85. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 918. 
 86. Melissa Healy, The Times Poll: 74% of Military Enlistees Oppose Lifting Gay Ban, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1993, at A1 [hereinafter Healy]; Laura L. Miller, Fighting for a Just Cause: Soldiers’ 
Views on Gays in the Military, in GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE MILITARY: ISSUES, CONCERNS AND 
CONTRASTS 70 (Wilbur J. Scott & Sandra Carson Stanley, eds., Aldine de Bruyter 1994) [hereinafter 
Miller]. 
 87. Belkin, Don’t Ask, supra note 8. 
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are “very” uncomfortable.88  A March 2000 study by Major John W. Bicknell of 
the Naval Postgraduate School found that between 1994 and 1999, the 
percentage of U.S. Navy officers who “feel uncomfortable in the presence of 
homosexuals” decreased from 57.8 percent to 36.4 percent.89  General Wesley 
Clark confirmed in 2003 that the “temperature of the issue has changed over the 
decade.  People were much more irate about this issue in the early ‘90s than I 
found in the late ‘90s, for whatever reason, younger people coming in [to the 
military].  It just didn’t seem to be the same emotional hot button issue by ‘98, 
‘99, that it had been in ‘92, ‘93.”90  The data suggest that the majority of service 
members feel comfortable around gays and lesbians, and that for most of those 
who do not feel comfortable, the issue has become less emotionally intense in 
recent years. 
What about service members’ policy preferences?  We noted above that in 
the early 1990s, only a small minority of male service members favored allowing 
gays to serve openly.91  An October 2004 poll by the Annenberg National 
Election Survey provides one window into service members’ current thinking.92  
According to Annenberg, 42 percent of service members believe that gays and 
lesbians should be allowed to serve openly.  Somewhat surprising is that a slim 
majority of 50 percent of junior enlisted service members (versus 43 percent 
opposed) believes that gays and lesbians should serve openly.93  (Officers and 
NCOs, by contrast, remain opposed.)94  This finding is potentially significant not 
only because it represents a shift from the 1993 polls, but because junior enlisted 
service members are those individuals whose supposed inability to develop 
bonds of trust with openly gay peers is the stated rationale for “don’t ask, don’t 
tell.” 
Unlike many other polls of military attitudes, Annenberg obtained a 
sample that was roughly representative of the entire military by using a 
scientific procedure in which phone numbers were “randomly selected by a 
computer from a complete list of thousands of active residential exchanges 
across the country.”95  Of the many thousands of individuals contacted by 
Annenberg, 655 respondents indicated that they or a household member had 
served in the military between February and October 2004.96  The responses from 
those military households were isolated from civilian households and analyzed 
separately to generate the findings of the poll.97  For those service members 
deployed abroad or unavailable to complete the survey, a household family 
 
 88. Zogby, supra note 7. 
 89. John W. Bicknell, Jr., Study of Naval Officers’ Attitudes Toward Homosexuals in the Military 
(submitted for the degree of Master of Science in Management, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, Mar. 2000). 
 90. Meet the Press transcript (NBC television broadcast June 15, 2003). 
 91. Healy, supra note 84; Miller, supra note 86. 
 92. See NAES 04, National Annenberg Election Survey, available at http://www.annenbergpublic 
policycenter.org/naes/2004_03_2military-data_10-16_pr.pdf [hereinafter NAES 04]. 
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member was queried as a proxy.98  One potential bias of this methodology is that 
if a family member holds views that are inconsistent with those of the service 
member, the polling results may not reflect the same findings of a purely 
random approach.  That said, some research demonstrates a degree of political 
similarity among husbands and wives.99  In addition, considering that service 
members are deployed throughout the world in so many different locales, 
Annenberg’s methodology appears to come much closer to approximating a 
representative, randomly drawn sample than other non-random methods for 
surveying military opinion. 
Finally, Donnelly says of the Zogby poll that “the twenty-six percent of 
respondents who wanted the law repealed could not compete with the 
combined sixty-nine percent of people who were opposed to or neutral on 
repeal.”100  Given that 32 percent of respondents were neutral, however, another 
way of reporting the data is that the 37 percent who disagree with allowing gays 
and lesbians to serve openly could not compete with the 58 percent who favor 
repeal or who are neutral.  Perhaps this is the point at which to remember that 
the rationale that Congress articulated for firing gays and lesbians is that 
heterosexuals could not work with gays and lesbians and develop bonds of trust 
with them, and that unit cohesion would therefore deteriorate following the 
lifting of the ban.  The question, in other words, is not whether the troops want 
the ban to be lifted, but whether they can work with gays and lesbians.  And on 
this point, as described above, the data are, in fact, decisive: a continuously 
shrinking minority of service members expresses adamant opposition to 
working with gays and lesbians. 
To return to a question raised at the beginning of this section, how relevant 
are the troops’ attitudes, especially when it comes to whether or not they say 
they can work with gays and lesbians?  In both Britain and Canada, prior to the 
lifting of gay bans, about two-thirds of troops said that they could not work with 
gays and lesbians.  But when policies changed in both countries, there were but 
a handful of resignations, and no overall decrease in cohesion.  If the Pentagon is 
ordered to allow gays and lesbians to serve openly, military leaders will find 
ways to ensure that the policy transition is a non-event, as it was in every other 
country that lifted its ban.  That is what matters. 
LOSS OF CRITICAL SPECIALISTS, INCLUDING ARABIC LINGUISTS 
In November 2002, the Palm Center’s Dr. Nathaniel Frank reported in the 
NEW REPUBLIC that the military had fired seven Arabic linguists for being gay.101  
The news made international headlines and struck a chord among the public at 
large.  Prior reports had indicated that intercepted intelligence cables warning of 
the attacks of September 11th had never been translated due to the government’s 
shortage of Arabic linguists, and the public was surprised that translators were 
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 99. M. Kent Jennings and Laura Stoker, Political Similarity and Influence Among Husbands and 
Wives (Institute of Governmental Studies, Working Paper 2001–14, 2001). 
 100. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 917. 
 101. Nathaniel Frank, Perverse: The Gay Ban vs. the War on Terrorism, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 18, 
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being purged under the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy.  Since the story first broke 
more than five years ago, additional evidence has come to light.  In 2005, for 
example, the Government Accountability Office reported that the military had 
fired 322 linguists with skills in important foreign languages during the first 
decade of “don’t ask, don’t tell,” and in 2007, the Associated Press reported that 
the military had fired a total of 58 Arabic linguists for being gay during the first 
fourteen years of the policy.102  The Palm Center was responsible for bringing 
some of these data to the public’s attention, and Donnelly writes that there are 
“several disparities” in the linguist data reported by Palm researchers.103 
Donnelly tries to cast doubt over the data by suggesting that because some 
of the linguists who were discharged had not completed advanced training, they 
cannot reasonably be called “linguists,” and she minimizes the significance of 
another report of fired linguists by saying their “type and level of proficiency. . . 
varied considerably.”104  In yet another instance, Donnelly suggests that the Palm 
Center (formerly named the CSSMM) published a misleading report about 
linguists who were fired for being gay.  Here is what she says: 
In July 1994 [sic], the Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military 
(CSSMM) claimed the military was discharging valuable personnel in important 
military specialties.  These included, for example,”49 nuclear, biological, and 
chemical warfare specialists; 212 medical-care workers; 90 nuclear power 
engineers; 52 missile guidance and control operators; 10 rocket, missile and 
other artillery specialists; 340 infantrymen; 88 linguists; and 163 law-
enforcement specialists.”. . .As for the eighty-eight discharged linguists, the list 
of “Primary DoD Occupation Code” titles includes, at number 241, “Language 
interrogation,” an occupation from which a total of fifteen persons were 
separated due to homosexuality.  But that is seventy-three persons short of the 
number of discharged “linguists” cited.  How to account for the discrepancy?  A 
Duty Base Facility Identifier Table, also provided by the DMDC, indicates that a 
total of seventy-three persons were separated from the Presidio of Monterey, 
where the Defense Language Institute is located.  It is not clear how the CSSMM 
came up with the claim that “eighty-eight linguists” were discharged due to the 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.  Fifteen plus seventy-three, coincidentally, 
equals eighty-eight.105 
If the reader of Donnelly’s accusation came away with the false impression 
that the Palm Center had tried to “pull a fast one,” we would not be surprised.  
What does surprise us, however, is that Donnelly ignores the qualifications that 
the Palm Center published when it first released the original data.  In the same 
press release that Donnelly cites above, and in which we reported the discharge 
of linguists, we noted that “with regard to foreign language specialists, the 
military discharged 73 service members from the Presidio of Monterey, home of 
the Defense Language Institute (DLI), and 15 specialists in language 
 
 102. See GAO, Defense Force Management, DOD’s Policy on Homosexuality, Report to 
Congressional Requesters, GAO/NSIAD-92-98, June, 1992, Ex.PX-5. Lolita C. Baldor, Military 
discharges gay Arabic linguists: congress members seek hearing, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 23, 2007. 
 103. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 922. 
 104. Id. at 923. 
 105. Id. at 922–23. 
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interrogation, for an apparent total of 88 linguists between 1998-2003.”106 Further, 
we stated that we proactively sought further data to confirm these figures, 
noting that “the CSSMM has submitted a second FOIA request to determine the 
specific language expertise of the discharged linguists, and to determine 
whether all of those discharged from the DLI were linguists.”107  We carefully 
qualified our interpretation, in other words, and we published all original data 
on our web site for readers to verify our claims.  And when we obtained the 
results of our second data request, we published those data on our web site as 
well.  Our conclusions remained the same.  The Pentagon has released data 
about discharged linguists in fits and starts, and often in confusing formats.  The 
Palm Center has published all the original data that we have obtained so that 
readers can form their own conclusions. 
THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR: NAME-CALLING THAT PASSES FOR 
SCHOLARLY ANALYSIS 
What to do when all the evidence stacks up against the position you favor? 
In 2005, a cadet at West Point named Alexander Raggio wrote a senior thesis 
entitled “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Be: A Philosophical Analysis of the Gay 
Ban in the U.S. Military,” in which he argued that the ban should be scrapped 
because it is inconsistent with military values.108 West Point’s English 
Department then honored Raggio with the Brigadier General Carroll E. Adams 
Award for best thesis, an award that is presented each May to the West Point 
Cadet who writes the best thesis in Art, Philosophy, or Literature.  The study 
also earned special recognition from the Vice Dean for education.  Elaine 
Donnelly’s Center for Military Readiness, in turn, nominated West Point for its 
so-called “Patsy Award” for having given the Brigadier General Carroll E. 
Adams Award to Raggio.109  The name of the award is based on the following 
sham definition of a “patsy,” which, according to Donnelly, is engraved on the 
award plaque: “An Official Whom Feminists Have Used to Impose Their 
Policies on the Men and Women of the Military.”110  The award appears 
designed to scold officials for what Donnelly refers to elsewhere as “fem fear,” 
which she defines as “an emotion that grips the hearts of men who are terrified 
 
 106. Palm Center Press Release, Mission-Critical Specialists Discharged For Homosexuality: New Data 
Reveal Extensive Talent Loss Under ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.’ June 21, 2004, available at 
http://www.palmcenter.org/press/dadt/releases/mission_critical_specialists_discharged_for_ho
mosexuality_new_data_reveal_extensive_talent_loss_under_dont_a  (emphasis added). 
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 108. Lt. Alexander H. Raggio, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Be: A Philosophical Analysis of the 
Gay Ban in the U.S. Military,” Senior Thesis, United States Military Academy at West Point, Apr. 29, 
2005. 
 109. See CMR Announces Inaugural ‘Patsy’ Award, (Oct. 17, 2006), available at 
http://www.cmrlink.org/PeopleintheNews.asp?docID=280 [hereinafter CMR]. 
 110. See CMR, supra note 109. According to the Oxford English Dictionary the definition of 
“patsy” is “a person who is ridiculed, deceived, blamed, or victimized,” 2 THE NEW SHORTER 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2125 (Clarendon Press, 1993).  On the etymology of the term as racist 
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Patsy 65 AMERICAN SPEECH 193 (1990). 
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that feminists—including women on the Armed Services Committees—might 
get angry at them.”111 
Donnelly argues that “Raggio had every right to express his opinions, but 
the paper was thinly sourced and did not even cite or accurately describe the 
text of the 1993 law.”112  As to the veracity and substance of Donnelly’s critique 
of Raggio’s work: Raggio offers twelve footnotes to support approximately 
eighteen pages of text, but Donnelly offers no evidence about the relevant 
standard, in other words the average or expected number of citations in a West 
Point undergraduate thesis.  As to his reading of the law, Donnelly offers no 
elaboration as to why she thinks it is incorrect, and no analysis of Raggio’s 
central argument.  If Donnelly wants to engage in a serious discussion about the 
quality of Raggio’s work, then she is of course welcome to do so.  While we are 
always glad to engage in an honest conversation about the quality of research 
related to gays and lesbians in the military, we are concerned when participants 
in the debate resort to name-calling in lieu of scholarly analysis. 
SHOOTING THE MESSENGER 
Donnelly refers repeatedly to the Palm Center as an activist group.113  In an 
online article describing the awarding of CMR’s inaugural “Patsy Award,” the 
Palm Center (formerly the CSSMM, but wrongly identified by Donnelly as 
Berkeley-based), is accused of misrepresenting our research and mission.  The 
web site states: “The Berkley-based [sic] CSSMM presents itself as an objective 
source, but it is actually an activist group that relentlessly pushes for 
homosexuals in the military,” and continues by claiming that “The CSSMM has 
offered honoraria to individuals who write papers or schedule college campus 
events promoting that cause, and routinely releases contrived ‘studies,’ based on 
faux data, to promote their doctrinaire agenda.”114  She writes, 
The only thing that has changed since 1993 is an illusion of momentum for 
repeal of the law created by a skilled and persistent public relations campaign 
that began in 2003, the tenth anniversary of passage of the law. . . . The public 
relations campaign has been advanced most often by periodic releases of 
various ‘studies,’ reports, or polls produced, sponsored, or influenced by the 
University of California, Berkeley-based [sic] Center for the Study of Sexual 
Minorities in the Military (CSSMM), now called the Michael D. Palmer [sic] 
Center, and like-minded groups.  A closer look at materials produced by the 
activist groups usually reveals questionable methodology and unsupported 
conclusions.115 
The CMR web site states that the Palm Center is “an activist group that has 
promoted homosexuals in the military for years—usually by releasing or 
 
 111. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 940. 
 112. Id. at 916. 
 113. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 918. 
 114. See  CMR, supra note 109. 
 115. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 915−16. 
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promoting various faux ‘studies’ that cannot withstand close scrutiny.”116 
Donnelly again refers to the Palm Center as “activist” in a reprint of a 
WASHINGTON TIMES piece from March 18, 2007: “In December 2006, for example, 
Zogby International released a poll that was commissioned by the Center for the 
Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, a gay activist group now called the 
Michael D. Palm Center.”117 
Her strategy echoes other critiques of the Palm Center’s research.  For 
example, and as previously mentioned, in 2004, PARAMETERS, the official journal 
of the U.S. Army War College, published a critique of the Center’s integrity by 
Major Joseph A. Craft of the U.S. Marines.118  Craft characterized the Palm Center 
as “a homosexual activist group spreading pure propaganda poorly disguised 
as legitimate research.”119  He added that the Center is “engaged in an intense 
information campaign to market, normalize, and legitimize the homosexual 
political agenda.”120  These repeated characterizations and labeling of the Palm 
Center’s work as “activist” are designed to negate its scholarly status by 
implying to readers that the work of the Palm Center is biased, that its studies 
are matters of foregone conclusion, and that its mission is influenced by a 
political agenda to the point of lacking any objectivity or integrity. 
The Palm Center is not an activist organization.  Unlike activist groups, the 
Palm Center publishes all data it finds, whether or not those data support one 
particular policy or another.  Indeed, Donnelly’s DUKE article includes evidence 
that we published in the Zogby poll, evidence which she believes bolsters her 
case.  Even Charles Moskos, the principal architect of the “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
policy, said that the Palm Center’s scholarship is “reflective of integrity and 
honesty” and that he found the Palm Center’s reporting of facts regardless of 
whether they support integration to be “remarkable and rare.”121 
As Belkin explained in his original reply to Maj. Craft, the Palm Center’s 
research conclusions follow from the data, not from personal beliefs: “While my 
passion for research derives in part from a desire to hold experts who fail to tell 
the truth accountable,” Belkin wrote, “my research conclusions follow from 
evidence, not from personal beliefs.  If Craft or others can identify foreign 
militaries whose effectiveness deteriorated or whose health care systems were 
overwhelmed as a result of eliminating a ban, I will modify my views 
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accordingly.  (My institute will entertain fellowship applications for this 
research, as always, in good faith.)”122  That offer, of course, still stands. 
Perhaps most importantly, there is nothing radical and very little that is 
unique in the Palm Center’s research.  Many other scholars who are not 
affiliated with the Palm Center, including military scholars as well as scholars 
affiliated with the military and military organizations, have reached the same 
conclusion that some of the Palm Center’s studies reach: allowing gays and 
lesbians to serve openly would not harm the armed forces.123  Experts agree that 
a growing body of evidence demonstrates that there is no negative impact on 
military effectiveness when gays and lesbians serve openly.  This is not to say 
that there are no unanswered questions or a clear path to policy change, but the 
basic facts remain: public and military opinions have changed since 1993, and 
the evidence has amassed from both U.S. and foreign militaries that firing 
people who say that they are gay is not necessary for the preservation of 
military readiness.  Donnelly is free, of course, to continue to pass judgment on 
the Palm Center’s integrity.  But even if the Palm Center’s research magically 
disappeared, the remaining majority of scholarly evidence would still show that 
integration would not harm the military.  For those who wish to argue that 
integration would harm the military, the empirical evidence so far simply is not 
there. 
A FINAL RED HERRING 
Donnelly argues that the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy is a misnomer 
because, contrary to what was widely reported in the press, Congress overrode 
Clinton’s effort to liberalize the policy and simply codified the ban that was 
previously in place.  “Congress rejected President Clinton’s ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell’ proposal with overwhelming, veto-proof bipartisan majorities,” she 
writes.124  “Instead, Congress passed a law that continued the pre-Clinton (1981) 
policy of excluding homosexuals from the military.”125  Donnelly repeats this 
claim in several different ways, saying that “there is no way that bipartisan, 
veto-proof majorities would have passed a law making it ‘easier’ for 
homosexuals to serve.”126  She claims that Congress adopted “unambiguous 
statements” banning homosexuals from military service,127 but that the Clinton 
administration “disregard[ed] the legal mandate” of the statute128 and that to 
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describe the policy as “don’t ask, don’t tell” “effectively slanders the statute.”129  
The only concession made by Congress to the spirit of the Clinton proposal, she 
writes, “was ommision [sic] of ‘the question’ about homosexuality” at accession.  
She claims, however, that “Congress nevertheless authorized restoration of 
routine inquiries about homosexuality by a future Secretary of Defense” if 
deemed necessary.130 
Donnelly is wrong on two counts.  First, she misreads the law.  The section 
of 10 U.S.C § 654 that addresses the matter of asking recruits if they are gay or 
lesbian does not have the force of law, but is contained in a “Sense of Congress” 
which is non-binding and which does not “authorize” anything at all, but 
merely states that “it is the sense of Congress that. . . the suspension of 
questioning concerning homosexuality” that was begun under Clinton’s interim 
policy in January 1993 should continue.131  Likewise, the section suggesting that 
a Defense Secretary “may reinstate that questioning” is also only a “Sense of 
Congress,” and is hence non-binding.  Thus the law neither bans nor authorizes 
asking, but remains silent on the point, leading to Donnelly’s second 
fundamental mistake: there is no basis from which to conclude that the policy is 
“inconsistent with the law,” since the policy does nothing that is forbidden by 
the law, and there is nothing it fails to do that is mandated by the law.  It is 
equally unfounded to claim that Congress never would have passed a law 
making it easier for gays and lesbians to serve, notwithstanding the 
“restoration” clause suggested in the “Sense of Congress.”  After all, Congress 
would not have suggested continuing the suspension of asking about 
homosexuality if a majority of its members wished otherwise.132  And so, in the 
absence of any statutory requirement to ask recruits if they are gay or lesbian, 
the Pentagon—quite legally—issued regulations that forbid the military from 
forcing service members to reveal their sexual orientation: “Commanders or 
appointed inquiry officials shall not ask, and members shall not be required to 
reveal, whether a member is a heterosexual, a homosexual, or a bisexual.”133 
Donnelly’s objective is to cast the military policy as one that, by law, deems 
homosexuals “ineligible” to serve in uniform, and she even takes the liberty of 
re-naming the statute the “Military Personnel Eligibility Act.”134  Having 
(incorrectly) deemed the policy one of “ineligibility,” she then launches a 
consequently misguided attack on several developments relating to the rules 
governing homosexuality in the military.  Upset that gays and lesbians are 
entering the military at all, she blames the Pentagon for failing “to comply with 
the legal requirement that entering service members should be informed of the 
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law, 10 U.S.C. § 654, which excludes homosexuals from the military.”135  If they 
were told they were ineligible, she reasons, they would not enter in the first 
place, and waste taxpayer money when they are discharged.  She then 
challenges the validity of polling data showing growing acceptance of gay 
service, based on the principle that respondents are more likely to support 
existing policy than to challenge it.  “Incorrect assertions that ‘homosexuals can 
serve in the military provided that they do not say that they are gay’ are 
probably skewing polls of civilians,” she concludes, “who mistakenly believe 
that homosexuals are already eligible to serve.”136  The Pentagon policy, in her 
view, “misinforms potential recruits about the conditions of eligibility.”137  As we 
have argued throughout this paper, her critiques are based on flawed logic and 
empirical distortions.  Yet another, independent reason why her critiques fall 
away is the mistaken foundation on which many of her arguments rely—her 
assertion that the Pentagon policy is an incorrect and unlawful implementation 
of the statute. 
We would like to be clear: the fact that service members who refrain from 
homosexual conduct and conceal their homosexual identity remain technically 
eligible for service does not mean that the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy 
successfully distinguishes between conduct and status—punishing the former 
while protecting the latter.  This is because the policy defines “conduct” to 
include statements of status, and defines “statement” to include any action or 
inaction that fails to conceal one’s status from commanders.138  Thus we agree 
with Donnelly that the policy has the effect of banning homosexuals from 
military service whenever they are unsuccessful at concealing who they are, but 
not that the policy makes homosexuals, per se, “ineligible.”  While the Pentagon 
has spent fifteen years failing to enforce the law properly, it is not the case that 
its original 1994 implementing regulations were “inconsistent with the law.” 
Indeed, the entire question of compliance and whether or not the law is 
consistent with the policy serves as a diversion away from the only relevant 
question, which is whether or not the service of open gays undermines military 
effectiveness.  And on that question, the evidence is clear. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS 
Is military effectiveness really what Elaine Donnelly cares about?  Donnelly 
accuses advocates of gays in the military of prioritizing “equal opportunity” 
considerations above “the needs of the military,” herself adopting a political 
rhetoric that, without any empirical evidence, posits a false tension between the 
rights of gays and the effectiveness of the military.139  Ironically, it is Donnelly 
who elevates political and moral considerations above what is best for the 
military. 
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Donnelly would have her readers believe that the military is strong and 
hard, while she traffics in fears of its softness and vulnerability.  In the opening 
of her article, Constructing the Co-Ed Military, Donnelly worries about an 
impending “disaster” akin to a fiery rocket explosion that threatens death and 
destruction in a time of national security crisis.140  The “armed forces” she warns, 
“are a prime venue for social engineering”141 and vulnerable to implosion from 
within.  She paints a picture of a dangerous cohort of civilian “social engineers” 
who, she counsels, plan to test theories of “social construction” on unwitting 
patriots.142  Invoking the 1967 Apollo 1 explosion as her disaster narrative 
analogy, she holds up NASA’s mechanical engineers as noble examples of “The 
Importance of Objective Analysis,”143 who after initially ignoring early warning 
signs (“communication problems, a ‘sour smell’ in the spacesuit loop, and a 
sudden, unexplained rise in oxygen flow”) went on to challenge and objectively 
reevaluate their basic assumptions leading to mission success with Apollo 8.144  
She suggests that, in contrast, irresponsible social engineers exercise “theoretical 
hubris”145 and “stifle objective analysis.”146 
Though she attempts to galvanize her readers on the strength of their 
citizenship duty to become guardians of the military institution, military 
effectiveness is not really at the heart of what has Donnelly, the President of the 
Center for Military Readiness, worried.  For Donnelly, the military as an 
institution is the guardian of society’s traditional male/female gender roles. 
Women’s integration into the military appears to be the “sour smell” in her 
disaster analogy, the early warning sign that signals gender trouble ahead, 
opening the flood gates to what will destroy the military as a bastion of 
masculinity and its attendant chivalric values: integration of gays in the military.  
In the company of other social conservatives who echo these same fears often 
verbatim,147 Donnelly believes the military should be a place that upholds what 
she calls “civilized cultural values” and “Western cultural values and 
civilization,”148 and by which she means a place where “good men protect and 
 
 140. Id. at 816−17. 
 141. Id. at 821. 
 142. Id. Donnelly uses the term “social engineers” throughout the essay. She invokes patriotism 
in the first sentence in describing military culture: “All branches and communities have proud 
histories, cultural traditions, and members motivated by patriotism as well as personal career goals,” 
at 816. 
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 144. Id. at 817. 
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 147. R. Claire Snyder, “Patriarchal Militarism” at 266 (in Masters of War: Militarism and Blowback 
in the Era of American Empire, edited by Carl Boggs [New York: Routledge, 2003]), cites Michell 
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“feminization of the military”: “If we continue to allow the social engineers, the feminists, and the 
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preparation that it needs for the future” and WASHINGTON TIMES columnist Mona Charen similarly 
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 148. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 930. 
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defend women” and where “traditional chivalry” is not dead.149 King 
Arthur’s legendary court of Camelot was the seat of the most chivalrous knights 
in the land and regarded as the pinnacle of civilized and chivalrous life.  By 
invoking chivalric values, Donnelly is participating in a neo-medieval 
mythology that bemoans the passing of a by-gone era that never really existed 
anywhere except in fable.  Of course, Donnelly disregards the reality that the 
United Kingdom, arguably once the seat of “Western Civilization” under the 
British Empire, has adopted a policy of non-discrimination and allows gays and 
lesbians to serve openly, in civilized co-existence. 
Cloaking her essay and her Center in the trappings of concern for military 
readiness, Donnelly presents a treatise against women’s civil equality and a 
platform for advocating patriarchal values such as the gendered division of 
labor and the protection of women.  Donnelly hinges her arguments about the 
co-ed military on her opposition to women, and especially mothers, in combat 
roles.  Her vehicle is the military, but her ultimate concern is society and the 
construction of a so-called “family values” platform.  It is in fact Donnelly 
herself who appears to view the military as a site for social engineering, and she 
worries that that project is failing. 
In brief, she concedes that women have served effectively in support 
roles,150 but maintains such situations, and the inescapable sexual tension of co-
ed environments, present a danger to women as well as to men in combat.151  She 
relies on arguments from women’s physical inability to perform (“physical 
burdens that lie beyond the capabilities of most women”152) to the class-based 
argument that elite, career-oriented military women (a “few ambitious female 
officers”153) seek combat roles to further advance their careers at the expense of 
working-class enlisted women.154  She further collapses violence against women 
in the military (rape, sexual assault, and specifically the infamous Tailhook 
scandal) with the threat of mortal combat all soldiers face by viewing the pursuit 
of the right of women to fight in the military as the promotion of “violence 
against women.”155  Meanwhile, Donnelly tends to dismiss the validity of claims 
of rape and sexual assault in the military by consistently putting the qualifier 
“alleged” in front of references to “abuse” or “victims of sexual assault.”156  She 
then labels policies that provide legal remedies for sex discrimination in the 
workplace “double standards”157 that should be eliminated along with “quotas.”  
For established scholars of women in the workplace, these are familiar code 
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words that dismiss the existence of discriminatory practices, which such policies 
are designed to address.  Donnelly’s arguments involving the co-ed military, her 
approach to gender equity, sexual harassment, workplace discrimination, 
gender violence, and rape all have a greater societal resonance, just as she 
intends.  
Women will be our weak link, she argues, speculating that “terrorists who 
are determined to create anarchy in Iraq by various means, including disruption 
of the Iraqi/American Training Teams, could easily use cultural prejudice 
against women and western culture to alienate male trainees who abjure 
obedience to women.”158  Or again, “International scandals involving sexual 
harassment, misconduct, or allegations of sexual assault between male Iraqi 
trainees and American women could be set off by provocative photos or 
interviews broadcast worldwide.”159  What is to blame for uniformed 
misconduct at Abu Ghraib?  Women in the military, she says, for in her eyes, 
they are responsible for disrupting an otherwise professional environment, all 
the while ignoring documented cases of abuse and misconduct that occur in 
presumably all-male units.160  Fallacies, such as the idea that women are 
inherently disruptive of standards of military conduct, and that men are 
incapable of complying with standards of conduct in the presence of women, are 
what Donnelly considers the social costs of a co-ed military. 
Among the other costs of a co-ed military that Donnelly points to are the 
creation of separate accommodations for women161 and the formulating of 
special concessions.162  Submarines are her case-in-point as she summons a 
vision of the special medical dangers inherent in women’s bodies.  She imagines 
what she calls “gynecological emergencies,”163 that “could endanger crew 
members and undermine undersea missions.  The only female sailors who could 
safely be assigned to submarines,” she argues, “would be women without the 
physical capability to have children.”164  She worries about the possibility of 
“birth defects to unborn fetus ‘passengers’ who accompany their mothers to 
work on the sub.”  In such baroque moments, Donnelly’s alliances are 
transparent, relying as she does on the rhetoric of fetal iconicity used by groups 
that oppose reproductive rights and women’s equality. 
In general, her analysis of women, gender, and the military deserves 
continued scrutiny as part of a larger discourse on women, the law, and society, 
which is beyond the scope of the present essay.  While the present essay focuses 
on her critiques of the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy and the research that shows 
that gays and lesbians do not negatively impact military effectiveness, 
nonetheless, it should be noted that her own prevailing fears of how women’s 
 
 158. Id. at 852. 
 159. Id. at 853. 
160.     See, for example, the Toledo Blade’s Pulitzer Prize reporting from 2003 on Vietnam era 
atrocities by the Tiger Force soldiers: 
http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/section?Category=SRTIGERFORCE. 
 161. Donnelly, supra note 1 at 860. 
 162. Id. at 872. 
 163. Id. at 863. 
 164. Id. at 863. 
07_SCHEPER.DOC 11/10/2008  12:32:57 PM 
448 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 15:419 2008 
bodies may disrupt the delicate functioning of the military as a preserve of 
traditional masculinity, are not unrelated to her anxiety about homosexuality 
and homosexuals in the military.  There is much more to be said about the 
linkages between disaster narratives regarding women (and women’s bodies) 
and anxiety over homosexuality (and especially male homosexual bodies) in 
Donnelly’s rhetoric.  Fear and regulation of female sexuality and homosexuality 
operate as twin forces for the preservation and production of masculinity and 
patriarchal values in military and civic life.  And the specter of these twin 
dangers are necessary for Donnelly to circumscribe women, restricting their 
social roles to reproduction and limited forms of civic engagement.  Donnelly’s 
writing therefore weds “noisy homosexuals and feminist activists” as “social 
engineers” of a cultural collapse figured by their perceived shared refusal of 
reproductive norms.165  In this, she sounds not unlike her nineteenth century 
Victorian predecessors.  Fearing the changes that women’s suffrage, the split 
skirt, and the reform of marriage and property law would bring, they hailed the 
New Woman along with the decadent homosexual as “twin apostles of social 
apocalypse.”166 
There is little new or surprising in Donnelly’s thinking as a self-described 
member of a cohort of conservative women who came of age under the tutelage 
of Phyllis Schlafly.  Donnelly romantically describes hanging a framed 
memento, a presidential campaign placard inscribed “Women for Reagan,” in 
her home every Valentines Day.167  Galvanized by their alienation from the 
burgeoning women’s movement, Schlafly inspired this cohort to form an 
opposition movement.  The historic 1977 National Women’s Conference held in 
Houston (the first and only national women’s conference to be sponsored by the 
federal government), celebrating International Women’s Year, also marked a 
watershed moment for anti-ERA counter-organizing.  Feminist historians have 
documented how specifically the idea of the conscription of women was used to 
mobilize opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment and ultimately secure its 
defeat.168  What is surprising is that since then Donnelly has been able to craft 
herself as an expert in all matters related to gender and the military and that she 
is able to publish and disseminate unsubstantiated critiques of scholarly work. 
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